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Building on recent work which has investigated social influences on memory 
and remembering, the present experiment examined the effects of social pressure and 
confederate confidence on the accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses.  Sixty 
undergraduate participants watched a video of a staged mugging and then answered 
questions about the video out loud in the presence of either one or three confederates 
who had also watched the film with them.  Unbeknownst to the participant, the 
confederate(s) always gave incorrect responses to four out of the eight questions.  
Participants and confederates were also asked to give confidence scores out loud for 
each of their answers.  Again, unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) 
always expressed either high or low confidence scores for the incorrect information, 
depending on condition.  Participants gave fewer correct answers, and were less 
confident, in the presence of three, as opposed to one, confederate.  Participants were 
also more confident, yet no more accurate, when the confederate(s) gave high, as 
opposed to low, confidence scores.  Thus the presumed independence of evidence 




The effects of social influence and confident confederates on the accuracy of crime 
judgements.   
The aim of this experiment was to examine whether confident co-witnesses 
(e.g., confederates) would lead witnesses to incorporate inaccurate information into 
their post-event recall of a criminal event.  This is an important question because we 
know that eyewitnesses to criminal events frequently discuss the events that they have 
seen with other co-witnesses, prior to any statement being taken by police (Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006).  The case reported by Memon and Wright (1999), surrounding claims 
of a second suspect in the Oklahoma bombing, highlights the negative impact that 
such discussions can have in real life forensic investigations.  Partly as a result of 
these concerns, psychological research has focussed on the various effects that 
discussion, or social influence, can have on an individual’s later memory 
performance.  These include memory conformity (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003; 
Granhag, Strömwall & Billings, 2003; Ost, Hogbin & Granhag, 2006; Wright, Self & 
Justice, 2000), collaborative inhibition (Andersson & Rönnberg, 1995), increased 
confidence in inaccurate details (Stephenson, Brandstätter & Wagner, 1983), or the 
likelihood of eliciting a false confession (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) depending on the 
task being investigated.  Research has highlighted a number of important caveats to 
these findings including the effects of the presence of dissenters (Walther et al. 2002) 
and the impact of postevent warnings (Echterhoff, Hirst & Hussy, 2005; Meade & 
Roediger, 2002). 
Typically, psychologists have used one of two methods to address these 
issues.  One body of research has attempted to model real life discussions using naïve 
co-witnesses (Gabbert et al., 2003; Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey & Lenton, under 
revision; Wright et al., 2000).  This has the advantage of being more likely to capture 
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the dynamics of naturally occurring discussions amongst co-witnesses as they attempt 
to resolve what did, or did not, occur in a particular event.  For example, Gabbert and 
colleagues (Gabbert, Memon & Wright, 2006) have shown that the co-witness who 
speaks first is likely to be the most persuasive.  A second body of work has used 
confederates who are instructed to include misinformation in their reports of the 
witnessed event(s) during an initial recall task with the participant (e.g. Dalton & 
Daneman, 2006; Roediger, Meade & Bergman, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). 
Often this method has been refined still further to the point where actual confederates 
are not present – they are either implied using experimental instructions (e.g. 
Echterhoff et al., 2005) or presented to participants on video (e.g. Lampinen & Smith, 
1995).  The advantage of using either actual or implied confederates, as opposed to 
naïve co-witnesses, is that it allows a more straightforward analysis of causal 
relationships between certain variables (e.g. the credibility, status, or competence of 
the confederate) and the likelihood that participants will report the misinformation 
included in the confederate’s account (Wright, Mathews & Skagerberg, 2005).   
In the present experiment actual confederates were used because there is an 
additional cost in relying on implied confederates.  As Gabbert and colleagues have 
demonstrated, misinformation presented by an actual confederate is more likely to be 
incorporated in participants’ memory reports than misinformation presented in a 
narrative allegedly written by another witness (Gabbert, Memon, Allan & Wright, 
2004).  This suggests that social psychological processes, in addition to the usual 
cognitive judgments, come into play when participants make decisions about where or 
not to report misinformation (Blank, 1998; Bless, Strack & Walther, 2001; Walther et 
al., 2002).  Indeed from the work of Asch (1951) onwards we know that participants 
engage in various social comparison and self presentational strategies when 
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evaluating information received from another person.  Thus when actual confederates 
are used participants are likely to make decisions on the basis of normative or 
informational processes (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  As 
Pratkanis (in press) explains, participants could either be conforming due to 
informational influences (e.g. if other people are doing it, it must be correct), or 
normative influences where they are confronted with two conflicting goals, either to 
answer correctly (i.e. in which case they would have to contradict misinformation 
provided by the confederates) or to maintain a positive relationship with the group 
(i.e. by conforming to the misinformation provided by confederates).   
Yet surprisingly there has been little research which has compared 
participants’ susceptibility to misinformation which is introduced by one, or more, 
witnesses.  Aside from the study by Vrij, Pannell and Ost (2005) discussed below, 
only one other study, conducted by Dalton and Daneman (2006), has examined this 
issue.  In Dalton and Daneman’s experiment, participants discussed a video-presented 
criminal event in the presence of a confederate (who was introduced as a peer) who 
attempted to introduce misinformation into their discussions.  Participants either 
discussed the event with the confederate in a dyad, or as part of a larger group of 3 to 
5 participants plus the confederate.  Dalton and Daneman (2006) found that 
misinformation effects were more pronounced in the dyad condition than in the group 
condition.   
Thus research using actual confederates may better reflect the social 
psychological processes which occur when witnesses discuss and immediately 
evaluate information presented by co-witnesses in real life situations (Shaw, Garven 
& Wood, 1997).  Although it is more difficult to ensure experimental control (because 
confederates must be trained to follow scripts), there are forensically-relevant 
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characteristics which can be manipulated directly and consistently using actual 
confederates.   
Vrij et al. (2005), for example, examined whether participants would be more 
likely to conform to incorrect information provided by confederates dressed in dark 
clothing which is, in some contexts (e.g. police interviews), associated with 
dominance (Frank & Gilovich, 1988).  Following Asch (1951), Vrij et al. (2005) 
assigned participants into one of four groups.  Each group consisted of one 
confederate and one participant (low social pressure group), four confederates and one 
participant (high social pressure group) and the confederates were either wearing dark 
or light clothing.  Participants were read aloud a narrative of a criminal event, after 
which they were asked to state out loud their answers to a series of related questions. 
Unbeknownst to the participant (who was always the last to answer), and in contrast 
to Dalton and Daneman’s (2006) procedure, all confederates gave incorrect responses 
to a predetermined set of the questions.  Vrij et al. (2005) found that participants in 
the four confederate / black clothing condition were more likely to conform with the 
incorrect responses provided by the confederates than participants in the one 
confederate / light clothing condition.  In another recent study, Gabbert, Memon and 
Wright (2007) found that varying participants’ beliefs about the quality of their own 
memory, by leading them to believe that their co-witness had seen a video-presented 
event for twice as long as they had, led to great memory conformity.   
Are there other forensically-relevant characteristics of confederates, or co-
witnesses, which might impact conformity?  One such factor, and the focus of the 
present experiment, is the confidence of a co-witness.  Research has consistently 
shown that, even though witness confidence and accuracy are only weakly related 
(Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, 1995), or only related under certain circumstances 
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(Brewer, 2006; Wells, Olson & Charman, 2002), people nevertheless rate highly 
confident witness as being highly believable (Leippe, Manion & Romanczyk, 1992; 
Wells, Ferguson & Lindsay, 1981; Wells & Murray, 1983; see also Lieppe, 
Eisenstadt, Rauch & Stambush, in press).  Thus, as confidence is often incorrectly 
assumed to be diagnostic of accuracy, there may be something inherently persuasive 
in “being confident”.  In other words, people are likely to use confidence as a proxy 
for accuracy and incorrectly assume that that someone who is highly confident is also 
likely to be accurate.  Indeed, Wright et al. (2000) found that the most confident 
member of a co-witness dyad was the most likely to persuade the other witness.   
The present study therefore extended the experiment of Vrij et al. (2005) and 
investigated the role of social influence and confederate confidence on the accuracy 
and confidence of eyewitnesses.  In line with the findings of Asch (1951) and Vrij et 
al. (2005) we predicted that participants would be more likely to conform to 
misinformation presented by three, as opposed to one confederate.  In a novel 
extension, and in line with the findings from the eyewitness identification literature 
(Wells et al., 1981), we predicted that participants would be more likely to conform to 
misinformation when it was presented by a confederate who claimed to be highly 
confident, than a confederate who claimed not to be confident.  We also explored the 
confidence / accuracy relationship in order to examine the extent to which 
participants’ responses were due to normative or informational influence.  A positive 
correlation between confidence and accuracy would indicate that participants were 





A 2 (number of confederates: one; three) by 2 (confidence of confederates: low; high) 
independent groups design was employed.  Confederate confidence was manipulated 
as follows: in the ‘low confidence’ condition the confederate(s) was instructed to give 
a confidence score of 1 or 2 compared to the ‘high confidence’ condition where they 
were instructed to give a confidence score of 6 or 7.  The dependent variables were 
participants’ accuracy and confidence when the confederates gave incorrect answers. 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students participated, fifteen systematically allocated to 
each condition.  There were 12 males and 48 females, aged 18-25 years old (M = 20.6 
yrs, SD = 1.43 yrs).  The confederates were all female students in the same age range.  
They were aware of the general aims of the study, but were blind to the specific 
hypotheses. A 2 (number of confederates: one; three) x 2 (confidence of confederates: 
high; low) Analysis of Variance revealed no differences in age of participant as a 
function of condition (all p’s >.05).  Although there were more female participants 
overall (n=48), 2 analysis revealed no association between gender and condition 
(both p’s>.05).  
Materials 
A short clip (37s) of a staged mugging was filmed for the purposes of this 
study to provide a more realistic and forensically-relevant eyewitness stimulus event 
than has been used in previous social consensus studies (e.g. Roediger et al., 2001; 
Vrij et al., 2005).  In the clip a female is seen talking to her friend and then walking 
off on her own, past a group of three men.  A few seconds later, two of the men run 
after her and one steals her handbag whilst the other pushes her to the floor.  A series 
 9 
of eight questions about this clip were devised by the authors (see Appendix I for 
details).   
Procedure 
Participants were taken to a room in a University building.  In the one 
confederate condition the participant entered the room first and the investigator then 
brought in the confederate who was introduced as another participant.  In the three 
confederates condition one confederate was already present and the remaining two 
confederates were brought in after the participant.  The participant was always seated 
to the immediate right of the investigator.  All participants and confederates were 
asked to read and sign an informed consent form.  Once the informed consent forms 
had been read and signed the following instructions were read aloud by the 
investigator: 
“You will now be shown a short video of a staged crime.  Once this task is 
complete I will ask you eight questions about the crime.  Please answer out 
loud one at a time when you are asked to do so, and give as concise an answer 
as possible.  Please do not ask questions about the video or discuss it with the 
rest of your group / co-witness since your answers must be based on what you 
have seen.  After each question you give please state the level of confidence 
you have in your answer on a scale of one to seven; one being not confident 
and seven being extremely confident.” 
Participants and confederates then watched the film of the staged mugging.  
They all then completed a distractor task (a word search) for five minutes.   
The group (or dyad) were then asked eight questions in a clockwise direction 
beginning with the confederate to the immediate left of the investigator.  This was to 
ensure that all the confederates gave their answers (and confidence levels) to each 
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question before the participant.  Confederates gave correct responses to four of the 
questions (questions 2, 4, 5 & 6) and the same incorrect responses to the other four 
questions (questions 1, 3, 7 & 8).  They responded with the same predetermined 
confidence scores for all eight questions (1 or 2 for ‘low confidence’ confederates and 
6 or 7 for ‘high confidence’ confederates) (see Appendix I for details).  The 
investigator recorded the participants’ responses and confidence levels on a sheet of 
paper.  At the end of this questioning phase the participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their time.   
Scoring responses 
Two dependent variables were derived from participants’ responses: (i) the 
proportion of correct responses given by participants when confederates gave 
incorrect responses (scored from 0-1); and (ii) participants’ mean confidence levels in 
their responses to questions when the confederate(s) gave incorrect answers (scored 
from 1-7).   
Results 
Overall, when confederates were answering correctly, participants also 
answered 93.75% (SD = 11.85) of questions correctly.  Participants’ mean confidence 
ratings for these questions was 5.20 (SD = 0.69).  These data were, as expected, near 
ceiling and, as they were not the main focus of this experiment, will not be considered 
further.  Of more interest, and the focus of the present experiment, were the effects on 
accuracy and confidence when confederates answered incorrectly.  In this case 
participants only answered 62.92% (SD = 31.05) of questions correctly.  Participants’ 
mean confidence scores for these questions were also lower than their responses to 
questions which confederates answered correctly (M = 4.52, SD = 0.96). 
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To examine the effects of the number of confederates and confederate 
confidence on participants’ accuracy and confidence scores when the confederates 
gave incorrect answers, a 2 (number of confederates: one; three) by 2 (confederate 
confidence: low; high) MANOVA was conducted.  The dependent variables were (i) 
the proportion of correct answers given by the participant and (ii) participants’ 
confidence.  The number of confederates X confidence of confederates interaction 
was not significant for either of the dependent variables (all p>.05).  There were 
significant multivariate main effects of the number of confederates (Wilk’s Lambda = 
0.74, F4, 50 = 4.23, p<.005, partial ² = .25) and the confidence of the confederates 
(Wilk’s Lambda = 0.82, F4,50 = 2.72, p<.05, partial ² = .17).   
---insert Figure One here--- 
Participant accuracy:  As shown in Figure 1, there was a main effect of the 
number of confederates on participants’ accuracy (F1,53 = 16.18, p<.0005, partial ² = 
.23).  Participants were significantly less accurate (i.e. gave the same incorrect 
answers as the confederates) in the condition where three confederates (M = .50, SD = 
0.32), as opposed to just one confederate (M = 0.79, SD = 0.20), gave incorrect 
answers.  As shown in Figure 1, there was a significant effect of the confidence of the 
confederates on participants’ accuracy (F1,53 = 3.53, p<.05, partial ² = .06). Overall 
participants were less accurate when the highly confident confederates were giving 
incorrect responses (M = 0.54, SD = 0.33), compared to when the less confident 
confederates were giving incorrect responses (M = 0.71, SD = 0.28). 
---insert Figure Two here--- 
Participant confidence: As shown in Figure 2, there was a significant effect of 
the number of confederates on participants’ confidence scores (F1,53 = 4.59, p<.05, 
partial ² = .08).   As shown in Figure 2, participants reported significantly lower 
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confidence in the three confederates condition (M =4.29, SD = 1.02), compared to the 
one confederate condition (M =4.78, SD =0.83).  As shown in Figure 2, there was also 
a significant effect of the confidence of the confederates on participants’ confidence 
(F1,53 = 3.78, p=<.05, partial ² = .06).  Participants were more confident when the 
incorrect information was presented by a highly confident (M = 4.78, SD = 0.72), 
compared to less confident confederate (M = 4.31, SD = 1.08).  
Confidence / accuracy relationship:  In order to investigate the relationship 
between participants’ accuracy and their confidence for the responses where 
confederates answered incorrectly, a Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted.  This indicated a significant positive correlation between participants’ 
accuracy and their confidence scores when confederates gave incorrect responses (r = 
.31, p<.05).  Thus, participants who were more inaccurate reported lower confidence 
scores and vice versa. 
Discussion 
The present experiment investigated the effects that a number of high or low 
confident confederates can have on an individual witness’s testimony, particularly 
when they provide misinformation.  Due to ceiling effects there were no effects of the 
number of confederates, or their confidence, on participants’ accuracy or confidence 
to relation to the four questions that the confederates answered correctly.  This is not 
surprising as non-misleading questions are easier to answer than leading or 
misleading questions (Schooler & Loftus, 1986).  The following discussion thus 
focuses on the impact of our manipulation of the number of confederates, and their 
confidence, on participants’ accuracy and confidence when the confederates answered 
incorrectly. 
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The number of confederates had an effect.  Participants provided significantly 
fewer accurate responses when three confederates, as opposed to just one confederate, 
answered incorrectly.  This replicates Asch’s (1951) findings, as well as those of Vrij 
et al. (2005), and demonstrates again the power of the social consensus effect 
(Pratkanis, in press).  These data do not support the findings of Dalton and Daneman 
(2006) who found that misinformation was more likely to be adopted in one-to-one 
discussions with a confederate, rather than in group discussions in which the 
confederate attempted to introduce misinformation.  However, in their study they 
employed one confederate who attempted to influence the rest of the group (including 
the participant).  Thus it is likely that the other group members acted as a buffer, 
inoculating participants against the misinformation they were attempting to introduce.  
In the present study, all the members of the group (the three confederates condition) 
answered incorrectly, thus exerting much stronger normative pressure on participants.   
Our more novel manipulation centred on the confidence with which 
confederates reported incorrect details of the event.  As predicted, this also had a 
significant impact on participant accuracy.  Participants were significantly more likely 
to conform to the incorrect responses of confederates who expressed high, as opposed 
to low, confidence in their answers.  These findings are consistent with the eyewitness 
identification literature that confident witnesses tend to be perceived as more accurate 
(e.g. Leippe et al., 1992; Wells et al., 1981; Wells & Murray, 1983; see also Brewer, 
2006).  It also supports the findings of Wright et al. (2000) who found that confidence 
ratings given by co-witnesses strongly predicted which response the dyad finally 
reported.  However, the important caveat to their findings was that this relationship 
only appeared to hold for cases when a co-witness confidently claimed to have seen 
an accomplice.  As Wright et al. (2000) note this shows that if a person confidently 
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claims to have seen something they are trusted more than if they confidently claim 
they did not see something (see also Wright, Loftus & Hall, 2001).  
In addition to the effects on participants’ accuracy we also looked at the 
effects of number of confederates, and their confidence, on participants’ confidence.  
Our data showed that participants expressed significantly lower confidence when 
conforming to the incorrect responses given by three confederates, compared to just 
one confederate.  This suggests that participants’ responses to the questions the 
confederates answered incorrectly may have been due to normative influence 
(Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Pratkanis, in press). In other 
words, the higher the number of confederates who answered incorrectly to a given 
item, the lower the participants’ own confidence score, suggesting that the participant 
was aware they were answering incorrectly.  
Interestingly, participants who conformed to incorrect information provided 
by highly confident confederates gave higher confidence scores themselves compared 
to participants who conformed to incorrect information provided by low confident 
confederates, irrespective of the number of confederates.  This effect is difficult to 
disentangle but it does suggest some element of normative influence on participants’ 
confidence scores.  Again, because participants were required to give both their 
answers to the questions and their confidence scores out loud, it is likely that similar 
normative pressure guided these responses (i.e., the participant’s response to the 
specific question, and the participant’s response regarding their confidence).  
However, the effects on participant confidence cannot be due entirely to normative 
pressures.  If they were then we would not have expected participants’ confidence 
scores to be lower in the three confederates condition.  One way to investigate 
whether this was the case would be to correlate participants’ confidence scores with 
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confederates’ confidence scores.  However, as a consequence of the experimental 
design, the confederates deliberately gave a restricted range of confidence scores.  
Confederates in the ‘low’ confidence condition always gave scores of either ‘1’ or ‘2’, 
and those in the ‘high’ confidence condition always gave scores of either ‘6’ or ‘7’.  
Thus it was not appropriate to compute this particular correlation.  
The positive correlation between participants’ confidence and their accuracy 
in relation to the items the confederates answered incorrectly also supports the notion 
that these responses were due to normative, rather than informational, influence.  If 
participants were responding as a result of informational influence then we might not 
have expected any clear relationship to emerge between confidence and accuracy - 
participants would give the incorrect answers because they genuinely thought the 
confederates were correct while they were mistaken.  Thus one might predict that, if 
participants were conforming due to informational influence, they would be equally as 
confident, irrespective of accuracy.  However, the positive correlation indicates that 
the participants were not confident in the incorrect answers they gave.  One 
explanation is that they succumbed to normative influence and gave these inaccurate 
responses because they did not wish to contradict information given by the 
confederate(s).  Of course, the causal chain is not entirely clear.  It could be that 
participants were more confident because they knew they were accurate, or it could be 
that, because they were highly confident about certain items, or because they simply 
had stronger memories for these details which inoculated them against the effects of 
confederate influence.   
As with all such studies, the effects of normative or informational influence 
are difficult to disentangle because the outputs (in terms of accuracy) are essentially 
the same.  What we can conclude from the above is that participants will report 
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misinformation when faced with a number of confederates compared to just one.  This 
demonstrates that well known social psychological processes also extend to memory 
judgements (Vrij et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2000).  Again, these data support findings 
from studies which have investigated confidence effects on memory conformity using 
other methodologies and stimuli (e.g. Wright et al., 2000).   
These data also extend our understanding of the factors which may make 
confederates or, by extension, co-witnesses more persuasive (Gabbert et al., 2007).  It 
also suggests that some of these factors can be manipulated experimentally in situ.  
Previous work has manipulated the believability and credibility of co-witnesses by 
providing additional information about the co-witness, for example their age (Kwong-
See, Hoffman & Wood, 2001) or status (Hoffman, Granhag, Kwong-See & Loftus, 
2001) before participants are exposed to (mis)information.  As noted by Shaw et al. 
(1997), that methodology focuses on how co-witness information affects subsequent 
memory reports, rather than the immediate effects of confederate misinformation 
which was the focus of this experiment.  It would therefore be interesting to 
investigate these immediate effects more fully.  For example, would participants be 
more or less likely to conform in the presence of confederates of different status (e.g. 
police officers versus peers). 
Future research should nevertheless attempt to improve the ecological validity 
of this method still further, perhaps by providing plausible reasons why certain 
confederates are more confident than others (e.g., they were closer to the event, have 
demonstrably better / worse memories than the participant; see Gabbert et al., 2007).  
In addition research could address the problem of normative or informational 
influence in a more un-biased manner.  As participants’ confidence judgements could 
have been subject to normative pressures in the present experiment, future work 
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should adopt methodologies that ameliorate these effects.  For example, participants 
could be asked to make two separate confidence judgments – one in public and a 
second in private (Wright et al., 2005).  Any differences in these two sets of 
confidence judgements might reveal the extent of normative pressures on participants 
when they are in the presence of the confederates.   
Another avenue for future research, which would speak to the issue of 
normative or informational pressures, would be to examine the longevity of these 
kinds of conformity judgements.  For example, Shaw et al. (1997) found that 
participants incorporated incorrect co-witness information into their own accounts of 
a robbery, and that this effect continued into a memory test 48 hours later.  Thus Shaw 
et al. (1997) demonstrated both public and private acceptance of the misinformation 
they were exposed to.  If the conformity effects had not carried over into the 
subsequent test phase then that would be reasonably strong evidence that participants 
were succumbing to normative, rather than informational, pressures in the immediate 
testing phase. 
A possible limitation of the experiment was that question content was not 
counterbalanced in this study – thus confederates always answered the same questions 
correctly, or incorrectly.  Care was taken, however, to ensure an equal number of 
central and peripheral details.  Care was also taken to ensure that the questions 
answered incorrectly did not differ in plausibility or schematic consistency (see 
Appendix I for details).  Ideally it would have been preferable to have eliminated the 
possibility of question-specific confounds entirely by counterbalancing questions so 
that confederates answered each one correctly and incorrectly an equal number of 
times.  However, the relative complexity of the present study, and the use of live 
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confederates (each of whom would have needed to memorise and accurately 
reproduce at least two sets of answers) meant that this was not practical.   
Conclusion 
The present experiment demonstrated that the accuracy and confidence of 
eyewitnesses were susceptible to social consensus effects.  Specifically, the more 
confederates who answer incorrectly and the more confident they are, the more likely 
participants are to conform to incorrect information they provide.  Although 
participants generally expressed lower confidence in their incorrect responses in the 
presence of three confederates, they gave higher confidence scores themselves if the 
confederates were also highly confident (despite the fact that the confederate(s) were 
no more accurate).  This means that police officers cannot treat information from co-
witnesses as independent (Wright et al. 2000).  As our experiment demonstrated, this 
independence is also likely to be undermined by the number of the co-witnesses and 
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Figure 1. Participants’ proportion accuracy as a function of number and confidence of 
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Figure 2. Participants’ mean confidence scores as of number and confidence of 










one (low) one (high) three (low) three (high)














Appendix I: Questions asked, confederate answers and confederate confidence scores. 
 
Confederates gave correct answers to questions 2, 4, 5, and 6, and incorrect answers 
to questions 1, 3, 7 and 8.  Confidence was manipulated by instructing confederates to 
give high (6 or 7) or low (1 or 2) scores to each of their answers.  The answers given 
by confederates are given in brackets, followed by the confidence ratings for the low 
and high confidence conditions respectively, and whether the item was Central or 
Peripheral (Ellis & Ashbrook. 1988).  The order of the questions follows the 
chronology of the video clip. 
 
1. Was the victim wearing a black jacket or a short sleeved top? (Black jacket; 1; 6; 
Central). 
2. Briefly describe what the victim was doing before she walked off on her own 
(Talking to a friend; 1; 6; Peripheral). 
3. How many men did the victim walk past before she was attacked? (Four; 2; 7; 
Peripheral). 
4. Did all of these men take part in the attack? (No; 2; 7; Central). 
5. One of the attackers was seen physically grabbing her bag; was he wearing a grey 
jacket, or a white jacket? (Grey; 2; 6; Peripheral). 
6. What colour was the handbag that was stolen from the victim? (Brown; 1; 7; 
Central). 
7. Another man was seen assisting in the attack; was he of white or black ethnic 
origin? (White; 2; 7; Central). 
8. Was he wearing a black tracksuit, or blue jeans? (Blue jeans; 1; 6; Peripheral). 
 
